According to Homeric legend, it was Hermes, the messenger of the gods, who invented writing. And the story has it that he first of all confided his invention to Zeus, adding that he intended to make a gift of it to humankind. Zeus, apparently, was not enthusiastic and begged him not to do so, fearing that it would result in the loss of human memory.

For us today, this odd little story with its roots in the pre-textual world, can be seen as an expression of an exemplary fear: that through the all-pervasive power of coded inscription something important has been lost; a sense of connectedness or wholeness perhaps; the deep knowledge of social life which subsists in the community of bodies. The issue framed by this story then, is not simply about the human capacity to recall hard information, but more about writing’s tendency to dismember and disperse the human subject. If we can be forgiven the impudence of attributing human thought to the mind of a god, Zeus, who we might take as being all-knowing, was surely never so naive as to have suggested that through the invention of writing, human beings would cease to be able to remember anything at all – the date of the battle of Hastings, family birthdays, or where they had parked the car – but that the regulated space of written language might render some of the shared aspects of human knowledge, immemorial.

This notion of a primal linguistic space – a domain of language which exists prior to the sign – in which the potential for human communication is neither distanced nor over-determined by the constraining rules of syntax, has continued to haunt modern linguistics. Roland Barthes, for example, in a key short article of 1975, The Rustle of Language, writes about the possibility of such a space in almost euphoric terms, describing it as an ‘expanded’ even ‘limitless’ space, constituted out of the ‘music of meaning’. In this ‘utopic space’, language he argues, ‘would be enlarged to the point of forming a vast auditory fabric in which the semantic apparatus would be made unreal’ and the ‘phonics, metric signifier would be deployed in all its sumptuosity, without ever becoming detached from it ... ’. Here, meaning would persist without being ‘brutally dismissed’ or ‘dogmatically foreclosed’ by the functional imperatives of the sign. Indeed, to use Barthes’ own words, ‘it would be liberated from all the aggressiveness of which the sign, formed in the sad and fierce history of men, is the Pandora’s Box’.

This dream of returning to a social space formed out of live communicative transactions finds an interesting echo in an early text by Richard Deacon, Silence, Exile, Cunning, a retrospective reflection on a series of drawings made during his stay in America in 1978–79. Deacon has described this particular year as a ‘turning point’ in his development as an artist, and the drawings in question, collectively titled It’s Orpheus When There’s Singing, as providing something akin to ‘a grammar’; as standing in anticipation of the work that was to follow.

In America Deacon had read and re-read Rainer Maria Rilke’s Sonnets to Orpheus and in the process found himself greatly attracted to the poet’s lyric conceptualization of ‘being’ – grounded in musicality, vocalization and the mobility and independence of the body in dance. This seemed to offer an antidote to the formal stiffness (Deacon’s
own words) of his earlier sculpture, and at the same
time provide for a different way of thinking about
the autonomy of the sculptural object.

Significantly, in *Silence, Exile, Cunning*,
Deacon situates his practice for the first time
firmly within the shared social realm determined
by language and he does so by metaphorizing the
making of work by reference to the making of
speech. ‘Since speech is constitutive of ourselves
as human’, he writes, ‘to speak is both to cause the
world to be and to be oneself. At the same time,
speech is not a thing, but rather it is a product
of community, built bit by bit in discourse. Speech is
not nature like stone or rock; it is manufactured.
To make is also to bring into being, to cause there
to be something’.

Even though in this short text, as elsewhere,
there are real difficulties in the way in which
Deacon deploys the language metaphor – drawing
for example, even when it is developed into a
systematic method, is no more capable of furnishing
a grammar than speech – this short extract
touches upon three central issues which are
important to understanding his work thereafter.

Firstly, by making speech and, by implication,
the making of things – a fundamental attribute of human being; and by bringing the
making of works of art within this general frame-
work, Deacon is being careful to claim no more for
the objects of art than for any other category of
manmade thing. There is a strongly egalitarian
under-tow to much of his thinking as an artist, and
under this rubric, if under no other, he is insisting
that works of art enjoy the same status in broadly
human terms as newspapers, washing machines,
motorcars and buildings. They are all part and
parcel of the one reflexive relationship – that of
manufacture – linking the human subject to the
world at large. Making the world present to us and
ourselves present to the world. It could be that
Deacon is guilty of a degree of over-statement here,
since the world is present to us in a brute sense
even if we do not speak about it or act upon it.
But in terms of providing a construction of the
work of art which has an unequivocal social
dimension – which sees it as arising out of the
complex, communicative fabric given to human
societies – the point is well made. And this brings
us to the second important issue.

Deacon makes it abundantly clear that he sees
speech as the vital connective tissue of community.
There is nothing exceptional about such a notion,
nor is it unreasonable to argue that the making of
things functions in a similar way. However, when
he then describes spoken discourse as something
‘built bit by bit’ and goes on to claim that speech is
‘manufactured’, a curious and highly significant
reversal occurs in the thrust of his metaphor.

Out of its very nature, spoken discourse is
never unitary. Neither is it constructed piece-meal,
sentence by sentence, in the manner of written
language. It is a much more fluid and open-ended
affair involving a whole range of different modes
of physical communication. St. Augustine, in a
quotation much loved by Ludwig Wittgenstein
and used by him as the opening paragraph of
*Philosophical Investigations*, puts it very neatly
when he states that ‘meaningful speech’ is ‘shown
by body movements, as if it were the natural
language of all peoples: the expression of the
face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of the voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting and avoiding things’. Before all else, speech is a product of our bodylines, and the inherent human tendency to conviviality.

Addressing a colloquium on ‘Style’, Barthes, in a typically witty aside, described speech as a ‘congregation of communicators’ beyond the constraints of grammar and the reach of conventional linguistics: the congregational aspects of which ‘remained to be described’.

Just exactly how speech manages to convey clear and unambiguous meaning, then, is no simple matter. Texts are self-evidently additive, unitized assemblages of a linear kind, subject to the syntactical closure which meaningful sentences demand, and with a locus in the abstract space of the printed or written page. Speech, by contrast, is more in the order of an ‘incarnation’ expanding and moving within the social space. Certainly it is not ‘built’ in any sense; neither is it ‘manufactured’.

In spoken discourse meaning resides as much in its disjunctions, its truncations and its dislocations – in a gesture of the hand, the involuntary twitch of a muscle or a barely perceptible flicker of the eye – as it does in those oral fragments which, in terms of grammar, happen to be glued together properly: the bits which make immediately transcribably continuous sense. In this respect, speaking tends to reveal what writing purposefully seeks to hide: the complex and genuinely mysterious, ontological terrain out of which all meaning emerges – the place of language itself.

Viewed in this light we might be forgiven for concluding that writing is perhaps a more appropriate referent through which to discuss matters like ‘building’, ‘manufacture’ and the
‘making’ of works of art. We might even be excused the suspicion that Deacon is guilty of making spoken discourse over again in the image of his own working practices. But this would be to mistake the serious purpose underlying his statement.

Later writings show Deacon to be very preoccupied with the problem of meaning. Most especially he argues against the two extremes of ‘literal’ and ‘epistolary’ meaning: meaning which subsists in a reification of the material facts of the work, as it arises, for instance, in Minimalist sculpture; and the meaning which depends on some kind of secondary text, validated through the person of the artist acting as a ghost author. What is also clear from Deacon’s writings is that he wishes meaning to arise from within the bounds of social discourse, and for this he needs a theory of making which is closely tied to the workings of language. The critic and art historian Lynne Cooke, in her essay Object Studies — a catalogue introduction to a series of works by Deacon grouped under the title ‘Art for Other People’ — quotes him, quoting Charles Harrison’s book, Empathy and Irony.

Sculpture mediates and models a notion of what the world is like, a belief which owes much of its embodiment in language as its objecthood and its material identity.

Harrison is quite correct of course, but the simple fact of sculpture’s ‘embodiment’ in language might not be considered sufficient guarantee of ‘intentional’ meaning.

Given that language is the very ground of social being, just how does a work of art — a sculpture in this case — in its specificity achieve common recognition as a ‘model’ of what the world is like? Is it, must it be, out of the artist’s ‘intention’ to model the social world and to accept the burden of responsibility for embodying its meanings, or might it come about in some other way?

By temperament Deacon would most likely choose the path of intention and responsibility, but like many other artists of his generation who trouble themselves with this question, he can also see the pitfalls that lie in wait along the way. If we are to take on board the general thrust of his metaphor we must conclude that he is particularly afraid of the kind of closure which the intention ‘to mean’ demands: the punctum; the terminus; the fullstop. Above all he wishes to reserve a space for innovation, and here we can see clearly why he chooses to link the making of sculpture with speaking rather than with writing. In spoken discourse meaning is always open to negotiation, and negotiation, in its turn, serves to situate innovation — the making of new meanings — firmly within the social domain. For Deacon, the space in which meanings are made is a communal space, and the artist’s relations to it is an ethical one. It is the very opposite of that free-wheeling space — playground of the ego — in which the artist rehearses and celebrates what Charles Altieri has described as ‘the metaphysics of an assumed marginality’.

And this brings us to the third key issue raised by this fragment of Deacon’s ‘Orpheus’ text: the problem of ‘being’.

Some ten years later, in an interview with the Yugoslavian critic Marjetica Potrc published in
M*ARS magazine*, Deacon seems to take a very negative position in relation to the idea of ‘being’. After a brief discussion on meaning in which he argues that the Minimalists, far from solving the problems of meaning, had only postponed it, he goes on to discuss the experience of the work of art and the relationship of experience to meaning. He praises the Minimalists for having got rid of the ‘essentialist’ notions associated with high abstraction, and states that for him the question of meaning is not about identifying the essence of the work with a metaphysical experience like ‘being’ and that he tends to view such experiences as ‘contextual rather than absolute’. There appears to have been a very significant shift in his thinking, then, from the time that he made the Orpheus drawings and wrote the commentary *Silence, Exile, Cunning*.

Closer examination, however, shows that this shift is not as great as it first appears. Under the sway of Rilkan poetics Deacon was unavoidably caught up with the question of ‘being’, and not just human ‘being’ or the ‘being’ of things in the world. The very first stanza of *Sonnets to Orpheus* sets the metaphysical tone of Rilke’s whole enterprise:

_A tree ascending. O pure transcension!_  
_O Orpheus sings! O tall tree in the ear!_  
_All noise suspended, yet in that suspension what_  
_a new beginning, beckoning, change, appear!*  

Transcendence, transubstantiation, suspension, the apparition of change: this is the stuff and vocabulary of a metaphysical experience of ‘being’: the idea that there is something above, beyond or outside of material circumstances; that matter might be rendered ethereal, or vice versa; that the
passage of time can be slowed down or even stopped and the exact moment of change—
"being" in the process of becoming as Plato called it—directly apprehended in the form of a ghostly
intimation of a different order of existence. Such
notions are the meat of Rilke's poetic vision, and
it is hard to imagine a close involvement with the
Sonnets of the kind which Deacon describes, which
at the same time rejects all of this. Nevertheless, it
is possible to detect a certain wariness on Deacon's
part as early as the Orpheus commentary.

It shows itself in a confusion or a reluctance
to confront certain very difficult questions with
regard to the constellation of meaning and
representation with autonomy. Writing about the
Orpheus drawings in his notebooks he says, for
example, 'the drawings are intentionally extremely
representational' but that he has 'difficulty in
deciding of what they are representations'. And
the passage continues: 'This concerns their
reference. I have difficulty in corroborating their
reference with something. Except I have considered
Sonnets to Orpheus to be their subject'.

The question which is struggling to surface
here is unmistakably that of the work of art's
autonomy. How does the intention to represent
something square with the desire for autonomy in
the work of art? How does the work of art come to
represent something other than itself and at the
same time remain nothing but itself? And, more
pointedly, precisely what order of experience does
autonomy represent?

Deacon's preferred solution is to interject
the works themselves—in this case the finished
drawings—into the space between his intention to
represent something and the specificity of the
subject—Sonnet to Orpheus—in the belief that
a representation might, will, has occurred, which
in no way depends upon the particularities of the
thing represented. It is rather like saying that
you can paint a portrait of someone without
referring at all to their physical appearance; and
so you can, but only by recourse to things invisible.
The painting would have to refer to the 'spirit',
'Psyche' or 'being' of that person, where 'being'
manifest through qualities other than their
physical characteristics. Picasso's retort when
Gertrude Stein complained that her portrait looked
nothing like her, comes to mind: 'No, but one day
you will look like it'. From Picasso's point of view
he had been concerned to represent the 'essential'
Gertrude Stein rather than Gertrude Stein as she
appeared in front of him. He therefore regarded
his portrait to be more 'true' than one based on
appearances.

But Deacon is clearly very reluctant to resort
to this kind of explanation. As he readily admits,
for him it is one thread in a knot of theoretical
questions which he finds very difficult to untie. He
wishes to retain a more or less strong version of
the autonomy of the sculptural object without having
to ground this autonomy in a metaphysical alterity
like 'being' and 'otherness'. He wants his work to
be implicitly meaningful rather than 'textual'; and
he wants to hold on to the possibility of intentional
representation without the sculptures themselves
being shaped in any obvious way by what they
represent.

In practice Deacon bridges this theoretical
lacuna by recourse to two key working principles:
the belief that work itself—his engagement with the processes and means of manufacture—is its own guarantee of meaning; and that both representation and autonomy are realized in, are determined by and in relationship to context. The model he uses to achieve this theoretical bridging is a theory of language, and here something of a contradiction emerges. Deacon's approach to language seems to bare some of the hallmarks of a phenomenological way of thinking, and in phenomenology the question of language is closely tied to the question of 'being'.

Viewed in the light of Deacon's early student background, the most intellectually formative period of which was in the sculpture department at St. Martin's School of Art between 1969 and 1972, this trace of phenomenological thinking is in no way surprising. At St. Martin's, Deacon worked in what was known as the 'A' course; a course which had been set up to provide an alternative way of thinking about sculpture to the prevailing ethos of the department: the perception-based, formal approach of Anthony Caro and the younger 'New Generation' sculptors. The 'A' course employed 'behaviourist' teaching methods, and encouraged the students to adopt a critical, even a sceptical attitude towards traditional notions of sculpture-making. The result was a wide variety of process-based sculptural work, ranging from performances to object-making which used materials as part of an 'event-structure' to arrive at a completed form. Integral to the teaching of this course was an approach to thinking which went beyond the normal boundaries of art historical and critical material into selective areas of general philosophy, linguistics and psycho-analytical theory. Certain writers and texts were from time to time deemed de rigueur, among them Edward Giffin's *Logical Atomism*, Edmund Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, as well as books by more fashionable writers like Marshall McLuhan, Edward de Bono and R.D. Laing. The approach taken to this material was by no means systematic, rather it served to institute a climate of discourse with its own very distinctive vocabulary.

In this milieu Deacon was engaged mainly with performance work, albeit work which had a strongly material-based aspect. This was the time of *Stuff Box Object*, 1970–71, a work which developed through several different stages: starting its life as part of a communal student project, progressing through a performance phase—during which Deacon took up a foetal position, working inside the box—and ending up as a process-based sculptural object. As the critic Michael Newman has pointed out, *Stuff Box Object* initiates many of the issues and themes which surface in a different way in Deacon's later work, in particular, 'it looked forward to the way in which the sculpture was to become both a literal object and a metaphorical substitute for the person', an aspect of Deacon's work we will need to return to later.

At this time too, Deacon was reading widely in the field of general linguistics and in his last year at St. Martin's wrote a paper linking language with perception, or to be more precise 'speaking' with 'looking' by way of description. A notion which is not far removed from the phenomenological term 'self-showing', part of phenomenology's tendency
to ‘linguifaction’—turning the world into language.

More generally, the period of Deacon’s studentship at St. Martin’s and his continued involvement afterwards with the studio-based performance group ‘Many Deed’ was a time of intense material and procedural experimentation as well as searching examination of himself and the social world, including the nature and purpose of works of art. It was already apparent that he was gifted with great practical intelligence: his hands had little difficulty in accomplishing what his mind thought. At St. Martin’s he was encouraged to challenge this facility and also to think in more radical ways about the possibilities of sculpture as an interventionary practice. Even so, in the midst of all this questioning and experimenting, concerns began to be established which were to surface in a different form in his mature work. Two are worth mentioning here: a fascination with the way in which materials behave when they are subjected to repetitive forming processes; and an obsessive preoccupation with the unfamiliar, or more precisely, with defeating in himself the ‘denial’ which the unfamiliar often provokes. In this respect, a piece like Speak/Work Performance, performed by ‘Many Deed’ in 1974, out of the way in which it used routine, repetition, disruption and play-back, might be considered as something of a model for the formal games and strategies of making which Deacon engages with in his later work. Writing in the Tate Gallery catalogue in 1983 he says of his working method: ‘I work with materials in the most straightforward way. I do not make plans. The activity is repetitious … I begin by shaping stuff … I may have something in mind or I may not. There are often radical changes. The unexpected happens. I am never sure whether I finish the thing I am making or whether it finishes with me’.

Underlying these staccato, seemingly very direct statements is a conception of sculpture as both practice and object of a highly provocative, even a revolutionary kind, and it has its origin in the event structure aspect of performance work. It opposes the ‘occasion of making’ against the more traditional notion of a pre-emptive creative vision; ‘serialized fabrication’ against ideated sculptural form; ‘repetitive action’ against original intuition; and the ‘condition of possibility’ against the intention to reach a particular kind of sculptural conclusion.

To return briefly to the Orpheus text. As we have already observed, there is an important side
to Deacon's thinking which seeks to hold the making of works of art within the scope and reach of a definition of 'normal' human activity. And to this end he invokes the generic category of 'things manufactured'. Manufacture, the making of things, he argues—and here he means all making, machine-made as well as hand-crafted items; consumer durables as well as sculptural objects—is to 'cause something', it is to 'bring it into being'. Once again, as a generalization, the statement is beyond argument, just as long as we pay no special attention to his use of the term 'being'. If we put any weight at all on the word 'being' the import of Deacon's statement changes. No longer is it a straightforward description but a reference to the existential root of phenomenology as represented by the writings of Martin Heidegger 1. Looked at from this point of view—and Deacon was reading Heidegger at about this time—it is reasonable to assume that he is implying more here than appears at first sight, and at the same time avoiding an important question of definition: just how do works of art differ from other manufactured things; in what sense might they be said to be special?

By making the metaphorical link between speaking and facture; in claiming that speech is man-made—he is careful to point out, remember, that it 'is not nature like stone or rock'—Deacon would seem to be giving tacit recognition to two and possibly three, quite distinct, notional categories of 'being': being in language; being in nature; and more obliquely, being in culture. These categories, of course, are not unrelated, on the contrary, our construction of the natural world as well as the cultural, is made from within language, since language has no boundaries and so permits of no exterior space. In Heidegger's now classic formulation: 'Language does not need to be founded, for it is what founds' 10. In this important respect, 'beingness', in as far as we are able to know it through language, is indeed, indivisible. All things, whether natural or man-made, are incorporated into the work and 'being' of language. All things partake in what Michel Foucault has called the 'illusionary inwardness' of language—our subjectivity—and the process of reconciliation this demands of us vis à vis our experience of the external world. But this is to speak of language only on the ontological level: it is to speak of Language with a capital 'L'; the foundational terrain which allows 'languages' to become intelligible one to another. And viewed from this site, to 'bring into being' is neither more or less than to 'bring to consciousness'. The question of how things come into consciousness, how they describe themselves to us—in which particular language or by what manner of usage—is the critical one. Indeed, it is not overstating the case to say that it is this aspect of language which provides the essential ground for the hermeneutic work of all changing and lively cultures.

Ludwig Wittgenstein in the posthumously published fragments Zettel, touches upon this question when he writes: 'Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the language of information, is not used in the language game of giving information' 11. A poem by Sylvia Plath, then, though it uses the same lexicon and rules of grammar as a Government circular explaining how
to go about claiming housing benefit, by the way in which it engages with language declares itself to be absolutely other to it. It deploys the panoply of linguistic means differently and for palpably different ends.

As Michel Foucault has argued, although as human beings we are possessed of the strong impression that language is internal to us – an interior faculty of some kind by means of which we negotiate our relationship with the external world – in fact the opposite is the case. Language starts from outside with the world of real things. The word is as much an object as the thing or state of affairs to which it refers, free to detach and relocate itself within new configurations of meaning, and poetic rhetoric depends crucially upon this mobility. The possibility of using many words for the same object; several expressions to describe the same mood or state of mind; new and different ways of speaking about ordinary things such as will lift them into the realm of the extraordinary, is the necessary precondition of the poetic text. Poetry works with, indeed it is a celebration of this arbitrariness in language. While the functional, communicative, administrative text closes down the space between the sign and the signified, seeks to preserve the illusion of a necessary relatedness on behalf of objectivity or clarity, the poetic text opens it up, uses it as a site for the play of individual subjectivity in writer and reader alike. Where the rhetoric of the instrumental text pretends a fixed relation between words and world, poetic rhetoric sees this relation as one which must be forged over and over again in the engine of the individual imagination.

To bring the example closer to home, and in a more complex form. Deacon, who in his notebooks describes himself as a ‘fabricator’, uses the language – forms, configurations and methods of making and building – we tend to associate with processes of manufacture, technical engineering, furniture construction and industrial pattern-making. His sculptures derive their surface detail from these various processes, which results in a complicated play of what he called ‘resonance’ and ‘equivalence’. They resonate other levels of meaning and refer analogously to other things in the world. At the same time they have a strong sense of identity as autonomous works of art. A work like Blind, Deaf and Dumb, for example, one of the two related works made for his Serpentine Gallery exhibition of 1985, looks very much like a piece of industrial ducting; More Light, 1987-88, has the appearance of an abandoned piece of space technology; and the sardonically titled Never Mind, commissioned for the Middelheim sculpture park, Antwerp (Belgium) and installed in 1993, looks like a huge wooden former of the kind that might be used to spin a large metal vessel or panel-beat something like an engine-housing. However, while they might be said to resemble certain familiar things – while they seem to make connection with objects that we know from other contexts – they do
not represent them in a straightforward way. Deacon's use of the term 'equivalence', in as far as it seems to suggest a hyphenation of the word 'representation', is important here. His sculptures tend to 're-present' carefully selected aspects of familiar things as a part of their linguistic array rather than serving to specify the sculpture as a singular representation. 'Equivalences', in this respect, are not authorized directly by the artist, but authorize themselves in the mind of the viewer as a transaction in language. Furthermore, these resemblances or 'equivalences' as Deacon calls them are a function of only one kind of language deployed in the making of the sculpture; we might describe it as a technical or instrumental language. And this in turn is overlaid upon another very different kind of language. This second language we might call 'poetic' language since it is centrally concerned with the aesthetic play of material manipulation and material forms. The ruggedness and immediacy which often characterizes the working of poetic language in Deacon's sculptures—the feeling that they have been wrestled into existence rather more quickly than their scale or detailing would permit—gives to them their very distinctive charge.

To some degree these languages displace and modify each other. The technical language enters the aesthetic domain as a mark of excess as a decorative overload. And this surplus of technical detail, in turn, serves to de-sublimate the aesthetic and formal aspects of the work, returning it to and holding it firmly within the bounds of human labour. We could describe this transaction as a redistribution of language, a transmigration of characteristic usages, and in some respects this is precisely what it is. But it is also important to recognize that this is not a simple homogenizing process. The result is never a true amalgam. Redistribution happens across a gap, a fault-line which draws into itself the viewing subject as an active agent in the making of meaning. Most importantly, it is in this linguistic gap that the identity of the object as a work of art—rather than any other kind of manufactured thing—is first negotiated. At the heart of this exchange, the pivot around which this double play of languages is organized, there lies a characteristic argument about the nature of sculptural form. We might describe it as a dialectic between inside and outside as well as between volumetric, spatial structure and what Deacon calls 'lump': the solid, fully rounded, no-nonsense sculptured object.

As we have already remarked, reading Rilke's sonnets and making the Orpheus drawings started Deacon thinking in a new way about the autonomy of sculpture. The works exhibited at The Gallery on Acre Lane immediately prior to his trip to America seemed to be studiedly earth-bound, their form ponderous in its construction and static in the way in which it engaged with space. The several untitled works which followed his return from the States had a very different feel to them. They enjoyed a more active relationship with the floor and with the space in which they stood. Indeed, Untitled, 1980, a large, curvilinear, open structure made of laminated strips of plywood jointed with steel, might be considered a seminal work since it manifests many of the procedural characteristics which Deacon returns to over and over again in the
Untitled
1980
Laminated wood
300 x 280.6 x 289.6 cm
years that follow. It is the first truly open form. It has its own very specific brand of formal integrity. While it sits upon the ground it does not seem to have been built in relationship to it: rather it seems to spring from it. Taken together these qualities make it the genuine precursor of the other great laminated works; pieces like For Those Who Have Ears, 1983; Blind, Deaf and Dumb, 1985; Double Talk, 1987: and Breed, 1989.

But this early work, Untitled, 1980, is significant for another and perhaps more important reason: it seems to have inaugurated the dialectic of inside and outside in a new way. The work implies a closure but is also possessed of a strong invitational aspect, reaching out and beckoning the spectator to enter its interior space. The possibility of effecting such an entrance is signalled by a tear-shaped opening – it is almost a schematically drawn vagina. Negotiation between inside and outside is given a distinctly erotic edge, an edge which allows us to approach the question of ‘being’ from a different direction.

Eros is unmistakably present when ‘being’ and ‘other’ are brought into a particular geometry of relationship. It might be described as both a ‘coming together’ and a ‘holding apart’; a proximity in which a distance is integrally maintained. The deep pathos which Eros commands is made up of
this closeness and this duality. Immanuel Levinas describes this alterity with great precision by means of the linked and hyphenated phrases, ‘being-in-one’s-skin, having-the-other-in-one’s-skin’... The comma stands between, binds together and holds apart. The skin, as container, becomes a site for oscillation and substitution.

With Eros in tow, then, ‘brining into being’ goes beyond mere cognition; beyond the selfish pleasure we routinely derive from sensible exchange with things in the world – our own ‘being’ is implicated. Deacon himself remarks upon this kind of dynamic substitution in an interview with the curator Julian Heynen. The spectator, he suggests, is ‘in the position of feeling occasionally outside and occasionally inside the sculpture ... the feeling of being engulfed by the object you are looking at does change the subject/object relationships ... one has the sense of becoming, on occasion, the object of the sculpture as much as the sculpture is object for you’ ... ‘Engulfed’ – taken over by, submerged within – seems to suggest more than a simple switching of the relationship between subject and object: it suggests a dissolving of the distinction altogether. Certainly it proposes a state of being with the work that cannot be encompassed by a term like ‘looking at’.

Another way in which Deacon describes this alternating relationship between the sculpture and the viewer is as ‘private engagement’ and he qualifies this by adding ‘as if with another person’. Furthermore he attributes this kind of intimate ‘engagement’ to the larger sculptures
rather than the smaller works which comprise the Art for Other People series. The experience offered by these works is more ‘public’ and has something of the quality of a ‘conversation’ about it. Once again ‘engagement’ seems to suggest some kind of encapsulation, a loosing of the self to the work, a wrapping up of the subject/object duality within an experience of solitude; while ‘conversation’ proposes a more open and objective relationship taking place as part of the discourse of community. This seeming reversal of our expectations with regard to public and private space raises another fascinating question in the domain of language. Is the language of ‘engagement’ occasioned by the large sculptures the same as that inaugurated as ‘conversation’ by the smaller ones, and if not, in what sense might it be said to be different? And more pointedly: given the atonality of erotic substitution which characterizes our ‘engagement’ with the larger pieces, does connective, communally constitutive language enter into the equation at all, or are we in the presence of an entirely different order of discourse?

Significantly, the notion of autonomy in the Orpheus story finds its most powerful representation in the image of Orpheus’ decapitation. His head is torn from his body while he is still speaking, and it continues to speak even after it has been thrown into the river. Indeed, Orpheus’ voice remains audible long after his head has floated out of sight. Eurydice, the subject of his adoration and his lamentation, has long since shaded away into the gross darkness of the underworld. To whom then is Orpheus’ severed head addressing itself and on whose behalf?
Top left:
Art for Other People No 1
1982
Stone, leather
10 x 90 x 30 cm

Top right:
Art for Other People No 7
1983
Graphite, galvanized steel
13 x 52 x 33 cm

Bottom left:
Art for Other People No 6
1983
Marble, wood, vinyl, resin
13 x 158 x 33 cm

Bottom right:
Art for Other People No 8
1983
Tissue paper, brass
35 x 45 x 23 cm

Right:
Art for Other People No 9
1983
Galvanized steel, rivets
33 x 34 x 11 cm
Surely in this brutally separated, continuously vocal head, song, speech, language itself is quite literally disembodied. The voice is driven by its own momentum into the beyond of language, to the outer reaches of reality, to the very edge of the unreal, and there, separated from the community of bodies, it becomes its own delicate affirmation. In this utter 'other' place, the head speaks sweetly to itself in its own tongue. It has only to convince itself of the truth of its own descriptions; it has only to persuade itself of the validity of those sadnesses and delights which animate its inner world. Thus it is that Orpheus' decapitation represents an extreme form of autonomy within the domain of language: the possibility of an utterance which is 'of' and 'for' itself, a retreat from the language as a enacting affirmation of community into the solitary space of one's own 'being'.

The disembodiment which enters into this solitary place implies is precisely that of an 'engagement' in which the quality of subject and object, the distinction between 'self' and the 'other', is dissolved. From within, this solitude has the appearance of the absolute, but in reality its offer is, in the very strictest sense, that of an 'engagement' which in turn necessitates a 'disengagement': we can enter it and leave it at will. It is in this respect the opposite of 'conversation'. Conversations begin and end; they are interrupted or they are concluded. Either way they are sufficient unto themselves; they carry with them no promise of continuity. 'Engagement' by contrast, suggests that there is always something there to be engaged with, something to return to: a different order of discourse, a different quality of experience. And because engagement is instigated in solitude it can only be shared paradigmatically. We might all have the same experience, but the attribution of 'sameness' can never be tested without recourse to the guarantee afforded by common language and common usage. The encapsulation which 'engagement' works with gives no such guarantee and needs none, so intense is the experience it provides.

Deacon's larger sculptures exercise a very different version of sculptural presence to the smaller works which comprise the Art for Other People series. In part, this is out of intention: Deacon intends the small works to function differently; he intends them to occupy the world in a more matter-of-fact way. Lynne Cooke, in her catalogue essay introducing these works, puts it very succinctly when she writes: 'In these small pieces Deacon can be said to be proposing a singular alternative to the homeless state endemic to much modernist sculpture, undermining the social isolation of sculpture as a fine art by seeking out spaces in which the discourse of high art is traditionally absent'. But Deacon's intention to difference is only part of the story. There is something about the way in which he uses scale in conjunction with different strategies of making, which brings the larger sculptures more into the domain of bodily sensation than mental apprehension. Addressing sculptural objects we tend in any case to 'look at' small things and 'look into' larger ones - where 'into' might be taken to mean a peripetetic investigation as well as the movement into or through something. In Deacon's case this 'looking into' is greatly enhanced by the
way in which he fabricates his work: the studied use of open form as in the elaborately constructed *What Could Make Me Feel This Way A*, 1993; and forms which are self-evidently not solid but are built as a skin, of which the most dramatic example is *Struck Dumb* made in 1988. Even when he chooses to use solid form as with *Distance No Object No 2*, 1989, the mass or 'lump' as Deacon calls it is constructed from the inside out, and its exterior surface – its skin – functions as a graphic record, a mapping of its internal complexities. In one way or another, all of Deacon’s larger sculptures describe and articulate an interior space and by doing so invite a particular kind of ‘interjection’ on the part of the spectator. The viewer is required to make an imaginary journey into the interior of the work, and once this process of ‘interjection’ has occurred, once the viewer has taken possession of this interior, then the inrush of contextual material is held at bay and a state of identification is achieved which is more physical than linguistic. As it is with the inward experience of our own body, the viewer is in an important sense ‘unvoiced’. Once inside, there is no ‘other’, there is no one to speak to, no one to hear. Paradoxically, if we are to describe this experience of inwardness, we must first of all withdraw from it, and this act of withdrawal is a withdrawal ‘into’ the world of constitutive language. For this reason the adequacy of our description must always be in doubt.

We have already touched upon the way in which Deacon’s sculpture utilizes the interface between two very different languages – the instrumental and the poetic – and shown how the